After the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the educated Chinese gradually realized the importance of railway construction to the modernization of their country. In the following decade, a number of railways were built with foreign loans, but gentry and merchants in the provinces soon developed an interest in the projects and demanded local control over the construction and ownership of new railways. In 1905, as part of the Rights-Recovery movement led by gentry and merchants, the right to build and manage the Canton-Hankou Railway and the Sichuan-Hankou Railway were obtained by the people of Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, and Sichuan.
In May 1911, however, the government announced its policy of nationalizing China’s main railways, including the Canton-Hankou and Sichuan-Hankou lines. The policy was in part motivated by Beijing’s concern over increasing provincial autonomy, which would be strengthened by provincially owned railways, and in part by its need of foreign loans. Following the announcement, the government concluded a new loan with a four-power banking consortium (Great Britain, Germany, France, and the United States) that used the railway rights as a loan guarantee. The government’s action caused an uproar among the gentry and business elite in these provinces. Although their fundraising efforts for the railways had not been successful, these provincial investors resented the recentralization of Beijing’s power and the further intrusion of foreign economic influence in China, in addition to the loss of their investment. They immediately organized railway-protection leagues and voiced their protest against the Qing policy through the newly established provincial assemblies. They also experimented with mass movements. Demonstrations and strikes were staged in Changsha; people in Canton boycotted government banknotes; delegations presented petitions at the capital.
In July, the Qing government provided compensations to the private investors in the provinces, yet the indemnity offered to Sichuan was drastically lower than that offered to other provinces. As a result the Railway Protection movement in Sichuan escalated. Led by the provincial assembly, the Sichuan elite employed nationalist as well as provincialist arguments in their attack on Beijing. Their Railway Protection League, with a membership of several hundred thousand, mobilized students for the cause.
By August, the protest had grown violent. On August 11, a huge rally in Chengdu, the provincial capital, was followed by a strike. In panic, the governor-general, Zhao Erfeng, ordered the arrest of gentry leaders. His troops soon clashed with the demonstrators in Chengdu, resulting in the killing of thirty-two people. Angered by the massacre, the people mounted massive anti-government riots, which spread to the entire province, and public order broke down.
The gentry-merchant elite consisted mostly of “constitutionalists,” not revolutionaries, but as the Qing suppressed their protests, their opposition became radical and their anti-Manchu feelings grew. Members of Sun Yatsen’s Tongmenghui in Sichuan, in collaboration with local secret societies, exploited the situation and launched their own uprisings. The latter succeeded in taking control of a few counties. In September, the Qing government ordered the New Army in Wuhan to move into Sichuan and suppress the riots. This gave the revolutionaries in Wuhan an opportunity to stage the Wuchang Uprising in October. The Sichuan Railway Crisis thus triggered the Revolution of 1911.
Wang Ke-wen
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