- Written by
- Zhang Zhexin
Visiting Fellow at The Henry L. Stimson Center
Tensions between China and some Southeast Asian states over territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS) appear to have eased with the agreement reached in Bali on July 20 between China's Foreign Minister and his ASEAN counterparts. The ministers reiterated their countries' commitment to exercise self-restraint and agreed to guidelines for voluntarily implementing a non-binding Declaration on Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the SCS signed by China and ASEAN states in 2002.
Many observers see the agreement as a direct consequence of the US's strong diplomatic and quasi-military efforts that implicitly took sides with Vietnam and the Philippines to deter China's otherwise more hardline actions-another successful example of the US role as an "off-shore balancer." However, such engagment should not be regarded as a model for the US's long-term strategy in the region, because it is rooted in four long-held misperceptions of China's objectives and approaches concerning the SCS disputes.
The first misperception is that China alone should be held responsible for recent tensions on the SCS for its violation of the DOC. Yes, Beijing has sent more patrol boats and fighter jets to waters around disputed islands or reefs in recent years. However, this was only because some Southeast Asian states have been unilaterally accelerating their surveying and exploitation of natural resources in disputed waters, and expanding military and civilian facilities on disputed islands currently under their occupation-both violate the guiding spirit of the DOC. Thus, the image of a rising Titan bullying its small neighbors comes more from a natural sympathy for the weaker parties than from a balanced appreciation of the situation.
Read more at STIMSON
H/T to China Debate Daily
Comments